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Global Welfare Implications 





This paper presents a simple, basic model to compute the welfare consequences of the 
introduction of a tariff on the CO2 content of imported goods in a country that already 
imposes a domestic carbon tax. The main finding is that the introduction of a carbon import 
tariff increases global welfare (and not just the welfare of the importing country) if there is no 
(or insufficient) pricing of carbon abroad. A higher domestic price of carbon justifies a higher 
import tariff. Moreover, a higher relative intensity of carbon abroad increases the desirability 
of high import tariff imposed by the home country because a border tax shifts production to 
the importing country, which in this case leads to lower environmental costs. 
If both instruments are used to maximise global welfare, the optimal domestic price for 
carbon should be higher than the external effects (assuming that there is no carbon pricing in 
the rest of the world) and the optimal tariff rate would be somewhat lower than the domestic 
carbon price. 
If the importing country has a fixed ceiling on emissions instead of a constant carbon price (as 
provided under the EU’s Emissions Trading System), an import tariff is always beneficial 
from a global point of view and its imposition lowers the price of domestic allowances, but 
less than proportionally. 
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GLOBAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 




A key issue in the economics (and politics) of global climate change is whether those countries 
that have decided unilaterally to limit greenhouse gas emissions at home should also impose 
‘border measures’ to protect their industries from competition from countries in which carbon is 
not priced. This issue has been extensively discussed in the rapidly growing body of literature 
on the economics of climate change mitigation policies, but most studies concentrate on 
competitiveness (of energy-intensive industries) and carbon leakage. Only a few studies 
examine the international trade impacts of a ‘carbon border tax’ and none seems to look at the 
welfare implications from a global point of view.  
The purpose of this paper is thus to provide a solid basis for any discussion of the economics of 
‘border measures’ to combat climate change. Since climate change policy, even when 
implemented at the national level is motivated by a concern for global (as opposed to national) 
welfare, it is important to adopt the same point of view when discussing so-called ‘border 
measures’. 
An important side issue in the discussion about ‘border measures’ is the distinction between 
plain import tariffs (on the carbon content of goods imported) and the combination of import 
tariffs plus export rebates.
1  
This paper focuses on the case where there is no export rebate. The model used here has only 
one good (of which the importing country is a net importer), and hence it cannot be used 
directly to assess the impact of the combination of an import tariff plus an export subsidy. 
However, this should not be of major importance given the well-known general result from the 
theoretical literature: a generalised (ad valorem) export subsidy coupled with an import tariff is 
equivalent to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and thus has no impact in the long run 
when all nominal variables can adjust. 
By contrast, there is no consensus in the empirical literature whether a border tax (BTA) is 
effective or not, i.e. whether it can correct for the distortionary impacts of (national) climate 
mitigation policies that result in a loss of competitiveness and carbon leakage. 
                                                      
* Daniel Gros is Director at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. He gratefully acknowledges 
financial support from Confindustria. He also expresses his thanks to participants at a CES/ifo Workshop 
on the economics of global warming as well as to Selen Guerin and other colleagues for helpful 
discussions and comments. 
1 The combination of import tariffs and export refunds constitutes what is usually referred to as border tax 
adjustment or BTA. Of course the concept of border tax adjustment is not new, but its application to 
environmental problems is. According to the final report of the decisive GATT Working Party (1970), a 
BTA is defined “as any fiscal measure which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination 
principle”. The destination principle enables exported products to be reimbursed for some or all of the 
taxes changed in the exporting country and imported products to be charged with some or all of the taxes 
charged in the importing country (GATT Document L/3464). Furthermore, the Working Party concluded 
that only certain indirect taxes but not direct taxes (such as social security charges and payroll taxes) were 
eligible for tax adjustment. This conclusion was important for the EU as BTAs are widely used by the EU 
owing to the fact that member countries rely on indirect taxes (VAT). 2 |  
 
A recent study by Veenendaal & Manders (2008) addresses directly the effectiveness of a 
carbon BTA on competitiveness and carbon leakage for the EU, assuming that the EU is the 
only country to follow this approach. In a general equilibrium analysis, they quantify the impact 
of a number of policy scenarios with a specific focus on the energy-intensive sectors covered by 
the EU’s ETS (Emissions Trading System). They show that when there is no BTA (and no 
equivalent transfer mechanism in the form of a clean development mechanism or CDM), 
production and employment in these sectors are negatively affected by the imposition of a 
domestic tax on carbon (for example the ETS). However, the imposition of a BTA (but again no 
CDM) can mitigate the loss of competitiveness: the loss in production and employment is 
halved. The overall welfare effects of the BTA for Europe is ambiguous since refunds are found 
to be welfare decreasing for Europe but import levies are welfare increasing. Overall the authors 
conclude that the impact of the BTA is too modest to make its implementation worthwhile. 
McKibben & Wilcoxen (2008) reach a similar conclusion: the benefits from the BTA are too 
small to justify their administrative complexity. In contrast, Majocchi & Missaglia (2001) use a 
general equilibrium model and show that BTAs are more likely to produce a better environment 
and less unemployment for the EU-15 member countries. Other empirical studies on sectoral 
impact give support to BTAs: Demailly & Quirion (2005) show that the BTA can be effective in 
preventing carbon leakage in the cement industry whereas Mathiesen & Maestad (2002) follow 
a similar exercise for the steel industry.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 provides a brief illustration of the 
intuition behind the main results using a standard setting. Section 2 then sets out a simple, 
standard partial equilibrium model which allows one to calculate the welfare impact of border 
measures under a variety of circumstances. Within this model one can calculate whether a tariff 
should be introduced at all, the size of the optimal tariff and the size of the optimal combination 
of domestic carbon price and import tariff. In contrast to much of the existing literature, the 
focus in all of these calculations is always on global welfare.  
The following short section 3 applies the same model in a different setting, namely one in which 
the importing country has a fixed ceiling on domestic emissions (and hence domestic 
production). It is shown there that the introduction of an import tariff always improves global 
welfare and that the level of the optimal tariff does not depend directly on the magnitude of the 
domestic emissions ceiling.  
Section 4 concludes. 
1. Simple illustration of the welfare gain from the introduction of a carbon 
tariff 
This is a simple partial equilibrium illustration using linear demand and supply curves for 
simplicity to show graphically the impact of a carbon tax (i.e. a tariff on the carbon content of 
imports) on global welfare. 
As usual the World is divided into two actors: an importing country (or group of importing 
countries) and the rest of the world (RoW).  
Figure 1 shows the global demand and supply curves of the good in question. Production of the 
good leads to emission of CO2 (at a certain, given, per unit rate). Private producers do not take 
into account the cost of emissions: hence the private supply curve is below the supply curve, 
which takes into account the external impact of emissions. However, unless there is further 
government intervention, the international price of the good in question is determined by the 
intersection of private supply and demand, point O on the graph. | 3 
 
For simplicity, we consider here the simplest case, which is when the home country introduces a 
‘cap and trade’ system such as the ETS in Europe. In this case the global supply curve is kinked 
at the quantity at which the ETS limits the amount that can be produced in the home country 
(given the limit on emissions and the per unit emissions factor). After the introduction of the 
ETS, the world price of the good in question is determined then at point A by the intersection 
between the (‘kinked’, private) supply curve subject and the global demand curve. It is apparent 
that the price is higher than before. 
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The issue at hand is what happens when the home country introduces an import tariff in addition 
to the ETS. The import tariff obviously reduces domestic demand and hence also global demand 
since it does not affect demand in the rest of the world. The import is here assumed to be 
specific, not ad valorem, because it is supposed to correct the externality that arises in 
production. Figure 2 shows the resulting equilibrium: with the introduction of the tariff the 
demand curve shifts down and the resulting new equilibrium price is lower than before 
(equilibrium shifts from point A to point E). 
The fall in the international price implies that foreign producers will produce less. Given that 
domestic production is limited by the ETS, global production must fall as well. The sum of 
domestic plus foreign consumption must thus fall as well.  But this is achieved by a rise in 
foreign consumption (since the price falls abroad) and a fall in domestic consumption of an even 
larger magnitude. This shift in consumption is due to the fact that domestic and foreign 
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What are the welfare implications of the tariff? The standard welfare loss caused by a tariff is 
the usual triangle (consumer plus producer loss) enclosed by points ADE. As is well known, this 
welfare loss is of second order for any ‘small’ tariff. 
In this case, however, there is also a gain due to the global externality in production. It is 
enclosed by the points ABCE (a ‘rectangle’ or parallelogram). The net welfare gain from 
imposing a tariff is given by the trapezoid enclosed by the points ABCD. It follows that a small 
carbon tariff must always improve global welfare. 
The intuition behind this result is clear. As long as the tariff is small, the reallocation of 
consumption from consumers at home to consumers abroad causes only a loss of second-order 
importance. But the gain to global welfare from lower foreign production is of first-order 
importance. The remainder of the paper shows that this simple intuition remains valid in the 
context of a fully specified model of demand and supply of a good whose production involves 
an externality. 
2. The model 
This section presents a simple partial equilibrium two-country model to study the impact on 
trade and global welfare of the combination of a domestic carbon tax with an import tariff. 
The world is divided into two actors: an importing country (or group of importing countries) 
and the rest of the world (RoW).  
More precisely the objective of the model is to analyse the impact of a ‘border’ tax (or import 
tariff) in the importing country on world production and welfare when production involves an 
externality (greenhouse gas emissions).  | 5 
 
2.1 The basic building blocks 
The basic building blocks of the model are standard, basic utility and production functions: 
For simplicity the total (private=social) cost of production is given by: 
(1)  ) ( s q TC TC =  
With the total cost function as usual twice differentiable and convex (TC’ and TC’’ both strictly 
positive). 
Production abroad is subject to potentially a different technology and cost function. 
(2)  ) * ( * s q TC TC =  
But it has the same general property of increasing marginal costs. 
Consumption of the good in question yields utility, given by: 
(3)  ) ( d q U U =  
Households abroad have the same preferences: 
(4)  ) * ( * d q U U =  
The utility function is as usual twice differentiable and concave (U’ strictly positive and U’’ 
strictly negative). 
Individual utility maximisation implies that households determine consumption by equating 
marginal utility to the price they face in the market. Domestic consumers have to pay a price 
that is equal to the international price plus an import tariff (or border measure). 
Denoting the international price by p and the import tariff by β, this implies (for the individual 
consumer): 
(5)  ) ( ' d q U p = + β  
Foreign consumers do not face an import tariff. They will set a price equal to marginal utility. 
(6)  ) * ( ' d q U p =  
Producers at home will set marginal cost equal to the price they face. If the importing country 
has a domestic carbon price,
2 this implies that: 
(7)  ) ( ' s q TC p = − + ε β  
For future reference it will be useful to consider the case where producers abroad also face a 
carbon price, denoted by ε*. Hence they will also set supply to equal marginal cost to the price 
adjusted for their carbon price: 
(8)  ) * ( ' * s q TC p = −ε  
Assuming that the EU (possibly the EU plus the US) is the importing country, the relevant case 
would be that ε* is equal to zero, but looking at the general case allows one to also analyse 
different constellations. 
                                                      
2 This model considers only the case where (in equilibrium) the importing country imports the good in 
question. Hence, there is no need to address the question of whether the ‘border tax’ should also involve a 
rebate on exports. 6 |  
 
The receipts from carbon taxes are rebated lump sum to consumers and thus do not influence 
their overall budget constraint.  
The only other relationship relevant for the private sector is that global supply has to equal 
global demand for the (possibly composite) good in question. 
(9)  d d s s q q q q * * + = +  
The system of five equations (5) to (9) describes the market equilibrium, characterised by the 
values for the five endogenous variables (the price and the four quantities – production and 
consumption at home and abroad). The exogenous policy variables are the domestic carbon 
prices ε (possibly also ε*) and the import tariff, β. 
The total differential of this system of equations is given by: 
(10)  d d dq q U d dp ) ( ' ' = + β  
(11)  d d dq q U dp * ) * ( ' ' =  
(12)  s s dq q TC d d dp ) ( ' ' = − + ε β  
(13)  s s dq q TC d dp * ) * ( ' ' *= − ε  
(14)  d d s s dq dq dq dq * * + = +  
As will become clear later, a key intermediate result for this model is the impact of an increase 
in the tariff, β, on the international price level. The impact of a change in the import tariff, β, on 
the world price (neglecting the two potential domestic carbon taxes ε for the moment) can by 
calculated from this set of equations (see Annex for details): 
(15)  () ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( )
0
) * ( ' ' ) ( ' ' ) * ( ' ' ) ( ' '
) ( ' ' ) ( ' '





= − − − −
− −
s s d d
d s
q TC q TC q U q U





In a self-explanatory simplified notation (u ≡ -1/U’’(qd), c ≡1/ TC’’(qs)), etc. this can be re-
written as: 

















A higher import tariff leads of course to a lower world market price, but the impact is clearly 
partial, i.e. the absolute value of (dp/dβ) is smaller than one. The fraction by which an import 
tariff depresses the world price is given by the ratio of the slope of the domestic net supply 
function (u+c) divided by the global net supply function (u+c+u*+c*).  
As shown in annex 4 this fraction should be closely related to the size of the importing country 
relative to the rest of the world (at least in the market for the product in question). For example, 
if the importing country were to consist of the OECD (essentially the EU plus the US and 
Japan), this fraction should be close to one half since the OECD countries account for about on 
half of world production and demand. A concerted OECD import tariff on carbon should thus 
lead to a fall in the price outside the OECD by about one half of the tariff rate. 
An immediate implication of equation (15)’ is that introducing a carbon import tariff while 
keeping the domestic tax, ε, constant increases the price at which domestic producers can sell 
(on the home market). Hence domestic production will increase, which is equivalent to an | 7 
 
effective increase in the domestic emissions ceiling. Formally this can be seen by using equation 
(15)’ in the domestic supply function (12): 
(12)’  ( )
0
* *




















The impact of a change in the domestic carbon price ε on the world price can similarly be 
determined from the above total differential as (see annex for details): 
(16)  ()
() ( ) ( ) ( )
0
) * ( ' ' ) ( ' ' ) * ( ' ' ) ( ' '
) ( ' '
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A higher domestic carbon tax leads of course to a higher world market price (it lowers supply at 
home), but the impact is clearly partial, i.e. the absolute value of (dp/dε) is smaller than one (and 
smaller than the absolute value of the impact of β on the price).  
If a higher domestic carbon tax leads to a higher world market price, it follows immediately that 
production abroad increases, i.e. there must be ‘carbon leakage’ in the parlance of the climate 
change literature. If carbon leakage is defined as the increase in production abroad resulting 
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In this framework a quantitative ceiling on emissions translates directly into a ceiling on 
(domestic) production. This implies immediately that the impact of on increase in the import 
tariff on the world price in the presence of an absolute ceiling on emissions like under the ETS 













Comparing equations (15)’ and (15)’’ establishes that the impact of a higher import tariff on the 
world market price is smaller if it is imposed by the importing country with an unchanged 
ceiling on emissions than if just the domestic tax on emissions is held constant. 
2.2 Global welfare 
Turning now to social welfare we have to take into account the externality generated by CO2 
emissions. Social welfare is given by the sum of the utility derived from households’ 
consumption minus production costs but plus the (negative) external effect that arises when the 
good is produced. For simplicity it is assumed that the external effect is equal to a constant, 
denoted by σ, per household, with this effect thus completely separate from consumption. In 
order to account for potential differences in carbon intensities (and hence technologies), it is not 
assumed that the production of each unit leads to the same negative external effect wherever it 
takes place. Instead production abroad takes place with a potentially different carbon intensity, 
which relative to that at home is denoted by γ.  8 |  
 
Furthermore there is one representative household at home and a measure α of households 
abroad (the measure of the global number of households is thus give by (1+α). Global social 
welfare is thus given by: 
(17)  ( ) ( )  + + −   + = s s q q * 1 - ) * TC(q ) TC(q   -   ) * U(q   )  U(q WW s s d d γ σ α  
A social planner would maximise this global social welfare, subject, of course to the resource 
constraint (14) d d s s dq dq dq dq * * + = + . 
Optimal policy (from a global welfare point of view) 





























































































Clearly any evaluation of global welfare changes requires information on the marginal changes 
in all the four quantities: 
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2.3 Welfare impact of a carbon import tariff 
The impact of a change in the import tariff, β, on global social welfare can then be written as: 
(25)































σ α γ ε
β
















dWW s s d d *
1 * 1
*
Inspection reveals that the terms in the price (p) disappear given the global resource constraint. 
Since the impact of a change in the import tariff on the quantities is given by the product of the 
marginal effect of a change in tariff on prices times the impact of prices on the quantities, 
equation (25) can be re-written as: 
(26) 
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dWW s s d *
1 * 1  | 9 
 
This equation can be transformed recalling that the changes in the four quantities can be derived 
from the relevant demand and supply function (equations (9) to (12)) combined with the impact 
of a change in β on the price (equation xx): 
 (27)  
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) ( ' '
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Using the simplified notation above and setting β equal to zero (i.e. the derivative is evaluated 
around a zero import tariff), this can be rewritten as: 
(28)  () [] ()
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This result has several implications:  
1.  The higher the carbon price, ε at home, the higher will be the impact of the imposition of an 
import tax on carbon on global welfare. In other words, if the importing country has a high 
domestic price of carbon the more it is likely that global welfare will increase if the 
importing country also imposes an import tariff on carbon. 
2.  The opposite holds true for the carbon price abroad: if the rest if the world has a high 
domestic price of carbon (high ε*), the more it is likely that global welfare will fall if the 
importing country imposes an import tariff on carbon. 
3.  If the home carbon tax is just equal to the externality (from domestic consumption), i.e. 
() σ α ε + = 1 , the imposition of a carbon import tariff by the importing country always 
increases global welfare as long as the carbon tax in the rest of the world is below the 
externality there, i.e. as long as:  ( )σ α γ ε + ≤ 1 * . 
4.  In general a higher relative intensity of carbon abroad (γ>1) increases the desirability of an 
import tariff imposed by the importing country because a border tax shifts production to the 
importing country, which in this case leads to lower environmental costs. 
5.  In the symmetric case, i.e. if both countries have the same marginal costs and marginal 
utilities (u=u* and c=c*), the result depends only on the difference in the two domestic 
carbon taxes (ε versus ε*) and the difference in relative carbon intensity: 
Sign [] () () [] {} c sign
d
dWW
σ α γ ε ε
β






1 1 * . This implies that the imposition of an import 
tariff by the importing country would increase world welfare even if both countries have the 
same domestic price of carbon, but the foreign country has a higher carbon intensity of 
production. 
 10 |  
 
The level of the import tariff by the importing country which maximises global welfare, given 
the domestic carbon prices at home, ε, and potentially also abroad ε*, can be calculated from the 
condition that:  
(29) () [] ( )

























are globalwelf σ α γ ε σ α ε β  
The same four considerations apply here as well. In particular in the symmetric case (same 
utility and cost functions plus same country size) the magnitude of the import tariff which 
maximises global welfare is given by: 







+ − − + − = = = c u
u
c c u areu globalwelf σ α γ ε σ α ε β 1 * 1 * *, max  
The import tariff that maximises global welfare is thus equal to a fraction of the difference 
between the gap between the externality and the domestic carbon tax at home and the same gap 
abroad. The obvious implication is that if both countries have proper carbon pricing, the optimal 
import tariff is equal to zero. For the special case of γ=1 (same carbon intensity) and ε*=0 (no 
carbon pricing abroad), the tariff that is optimal from a global point of view is equal to a 









= = = = c u
u
c c u areu globalwelf ε β γ 1 *, *, max  
The size of the fraction depends on the (absolute values of the) slope of the demand function 
relative to that of the supply function. This implies that the optimal import tariff will not create a 
totally ‘level’ playing field in the sense that domestic producers will still be at a ‘competitive 
disadvantage’ relative to foreign producers after the imposition of the optimal import tariff. It is 
apparent that a higher value of γ (a higher relative carbon intensity of production abroad) 
justifies a higher import tariff. 
2.4 Optimal domestic carbon tax 
The analysis so far has taken the domestic carbon tax as given. However, this need not be the 
case. An enlightened home government should choose both the domestic carbon price and the 
import tariff in an optimal manner. In order to discuss this choice, one needs to calculate the 
impact of a change in the domestic carbon tax, ε, on global social welfare. The starting point can 
again be the total differential (25) of the equation describing global welfare. 






























































































Using again the set of equations that describe the marginal impact on global welfare of a change 
in all the four quantities in terms of prices and taxes, this can be rewritten as: 
(33)
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*  
Inspection reveals that the terms in the price (p) disappear given the global resource constraint. 
Since the impact of a change in the domestic carbon tax on the quantities is given by the product | 11 
 
of the marginal effect of a change in the tax on the price times the impact of the price on the 
quantities (derived from the relevant demand and supply function (equations xx to xx)), this 
equation can be re-written as: 
(34)  
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This equation can be simplified using the notation from above: 
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If one considers the impact of the introduction (or increase in) of a domestic carbon tax on 
global welfare, it makes sense to assume that there is no import tax (β=0).  
In this case several conclusions follow immediately: 
For the case of equality in technology, or rather identical slopes of the supply functions (c=c*), 
it follows that: 






























































And thus an increase in the domestic tax on carbon will always increase global welfare if both ε 
and ε* are initially zero and the relative carbon intensity abroad is at most equal to that at home 
γ <1. In the case of equal technology the domestic carbon price that maximises global welfare 
can be derived by setting the RHS of this last equation to zero. The resulting expression can be 
simplified to: 







+ − + + =
*
1 * 1 max u u c
c
are globalwelf σ α γ ε σ α ε  
For the case of no domestic tax abroad (ε*=0), this can be rewritten as: 









1 1 max u u c
c
are globalwelf γ σ α ε  
The intuition behind this result is clear: the optimal domestic carbon price is equal to the 
domestically generated distortion (given the carbon intensity at home) minus a fraction of the 
distortion given the carbon intensity γ abroad (with the fraction given by c/(c+u+u*). The higher 
the foreign distortion (a high value of γ) the less it makes sense to impose a domestic carbon tax 
because this leads at least to a partial shift in production abroad, which might not be good for 
global welfare if the carbon intensity abroad is higher than the one at home.  
Inspection of the last equation reveals that the importing country cannot improve global welfare 














≥ = ε γ  12 |  
 
In this case it would be better for global welfare that the importing country subsidises domestic 
production. This would lead to a shift in aggregate global production, but global emissions 
would be lower because the shift towards production at home, which is much less carbon-
intensive than production at home (under this condition), would lead to lower overall emissions.  
A higher carbon price abroad would obviously also motivate (from a global welfare point of 
view) a higher carbon price at home. 
2.5 Optimal choice of both policy instruments 
Finally, one can consider the case of an altruistic country that sets both (domestic) policy 
instruments in order to maximise global welfare. Such a country would set both instruments 
according to: 







+ − − + − = = = c u
u
c c u areu globalwelf σ α γ ε σ α ε β 1 * 1 * *, max  
(40)  () [] () () * 1
*
















Solving the second equation for the optimal domestic carbon tax and substituting the result into 
the first equation yields an expression of the optimal (from a global point of view) tariff in terms 
of the parameters of the model: 
(41)
 









































In a simplified form, this can be re-written as: 





⎛ − + =
c
u
areuonboth globalwelf * 1 max ε σ α γ β  
It follows that when the importing country concentrates on global welfare in setting both policy 
variables, the ‘optimal’ import tariff is proportional to the distortion abroad  () [] * 1 ε σ α γ − + , 
which is always positive as long as the foreign country does not impose proper carbon pricing. 
This general result is independent of the shapes of the supply and demand functions.  
Substituting this last equation into the equation that determines the optimal domestic carbon tax 
yields: 





⎛ − + = 1 * 1 max c
u
areuonboth globalwelf  
Or:  





⎛ − + = + + = 1 * 1 1 max max c
u
areuonboth globalwelf areuonboth globalwelf  | 13 
 
It follows that the optimal import tariff is always smaller than the (optimal) domestic carbon tax. 
The difference is given by the negative global externality that arises through domestic 
production  () [] σ α + 1 . 
() [] σ α + 1 . 
3. Quantitative ceilings (ETS) 
The welfare impact of an import tariff in the presence of an emissions trading system (ETS) that 
fixes a ceiling on domestic supply can be calculated from the total differential of global welfare 
(in this case the domestic carbon price becomes endogenous and equivalent to the price of a 
domestic allowance under an auction system): 








































































Given that the quantity produced at home (qs) is capped by the ETS this can be simplified to: 












































Inspection reveals that the terms in the price (p) disappear given the global resource constraint. 
Since the impact of a change in the import tariff on the quantities is given by the product of the 
marginal effect of a change in tariff on prices times the impact of prices on the quantities, 
equation (25)’ can be simplified to: 














































1 *  
A first result is immediate if one considers the benchmark case of ε*=0. In this case it is always 
in the interest of global welfare to introduce an import tariff (i.e. an increase of β from zero to 





















































The intuition behind this result is clear. If the tariff is equal to zero the reallocation of 
consumption from consumers at home to consumers abroad causes only a loss of second-order 
importance. But the gain to global welfare from lower foreign production is of first-order 
importance if the rest of the world does not price carbon properly (i.e. if  () σ α γ ε + 〈 1 * ).  This 
is exactly the effect shown in the figure 2 of section 1 above. 
For the general case of β positive, equation (26)’ can be transformed recalling that the changes 
in the two quantities can be derived from the relevant demand and supply function (equations 
(10) and (13)): 
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Substituting out for the supply and demand function as well as the impact of the tariff on the 
international price, this can be rewritten as: 










































This expression will be positive as long as the expression in the first curly brackets is negative 
given that the expression in the second curly brackets (impact of a change in β on the price 
(equation (15)’’) is always negative.  
The tariff that maximises global welfare under the condition that the ETS at home fixes 
domestic production is thus given by the condition that: 






























c optimalETS σ α γ ε β  
This result has several implications:  
1)  Not surprisingly, the optimal tariff is higher the higher is γ, i.e. the carbon intensity of 
production abroad. However, the optimal tariff remains positive even if the carbon intensity 
abroad is much lower than at home (γ<<1) – provided of course that the foreign carbon 
price is insufficient to cover the externality abroad. 
2)  A higher slope of supply function abroad or equivalently a larger production base abroad, 
c*, also leads to a higher optimal tariff. 
3)  A higher slope of the demand curve at home or a larger share of the home country in world 
income, u (relative to u*), implies a lower optimal tariff. 
4)  Obviously a higher carbon tax abroad (ε*) implies a lower optimal tariff and if the foreign 
country imposes a carbon tax which just offsets the externality the rationale for a carbon 
tariff disappears.  
5)  The level of the domestic emissions cap (and hence the level of the implicit domestic carbon 
price, ε) does not directly influence the optimal tariff. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the economic impact of ‘border 
measures’ in climate change policy from a global welfare point of view. Most of the literature 
has focused on two related, but separate issues which concern only national welfare; namely 
‘carbon leakage’ and the loss of competitiveness of energy-intensive industries in countries that 
introduce limits on emissions. However, climate change policy is motivated in the first instance 
by a concern for global welfare. Hence one should not look at these issues from a national or 
regional point of view. | 15 
 
Moreover, addressing these issues from an economic welfare point of view means that one 
cannot look exclusively at the impact of any one measure on the amount of CO2 emissions, but 
also at the cost of production and consumer welfare. 
The results obtained with a simple model are straightforward and intuitively clear. Overall, as 
one would expect, an import tariff improves global welfare because this transfers carbon 
pricing, at least partially, via trade flows, even to those parts of the world whose governments 
have so far refrained from imposing any domestic measures. The optimal level of the tariff rate 
(from a global welfare point of view) depends on many parameters, such as the elasticities of 
demand and supply, but the key parameter remains the external impact of emissions. The model 
also shows that the rationale for the imposition of a carbon import tariff remains even if carbon 
efficiency abroad is higher than at home. 
This paper has abstracted from the inter-temporal aspects in inherent in the natural resource 
extraction problem emphasised by Sinn (2008).  However, the general flavour of the results, 
namely that global welfare should be improved by complementing a domestic ‘cap and trade’ 
system with an tariff on the carbon content of imports, should not be affected. Further research 
on this aspect would, however, be useful taking into account also of the fact that carbon capture 
and storage technologies can break the direct link between the use of fossil fuels and the release 
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Annexes. Details of calculations 
Annex 1 Calculation of the impact of changes in the import tariff, β, and of the domestic carbon 
tax, ε, on the international price. The starting point is the total differential of the five equations 
describing the equilibrium in all markets: 
A(10)’ () d d dq q U d dp = + ) ( ' ' / β  
A(11)’  d d dq q U dp * ) * ( ' ' / =  
A(12)’ () s s dq q TC d d dp = − + ) ( ' ' / ε β  
A(13)’ () s s dq q TC d dp * ) * ( ' ' / * = − ε  
The global resource constraint (14) implies that the sum of the first two terms (change in global 
demand) must be equal to the sum of the last two terms (change in global supply): 
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The result for dp/dβ (and dε/dβ) is then immediate. 
 
Annex 2. Emissions trading system 
With a fixed limit on domestic production, the impact of an import tariff is somewhat different. 
With an ETS-like limit (dqs=0), the system becomes: 
A2 (10)  d d dq q U d dp ) ( ' ' = + β  
A2 (11)  d d dq q U dp * ) * ( ' ' =  
A2 (12)  0 = − + ε β d d dp  
A2 (13)  s s dq q TC d dp * ) * ( ' ' *= − ε  
A2 (14)  d d s dq dq dq * * + =  
With ε now endogenous (and qs exogenous because fixed by the ETS), equation 12 expresses 
the intuition that the sum of the change in the price and the import tariff must equal the change 
in the domestic carbon price, ε, in order to keep domestic production (and hence domestic 
emissions) constant. 
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With domestic supply fixed (by the ETS), it follows that the only impact an import tariff can 
have is via lower domestic consumption, which in turn implies a lower price globally. 
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Annex 3 Carbon leakage 
A unit increase in the domestic carbon price leads to an increase in the world market price and 
hence an increase in production abroad equal to: 
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At home production falls, with the fall determined by the supply function (12): 
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One could define ‘carbon leakage’ in relative terms, i.e. as the absolute value of the ratio 
(increase in foreign production)/(fall in domestic production). This would be equal to: | 19 
 

















Leakage will thus be always partial and it depends on the size of the sum of the slopes of the 
demand curves relative to the slope of the supply curve abroad. The less elastic demand relative 
to supply (i.e. the smaller u and u* relative to c*) the more important will be leakage. 
 
 
Annex 4 Country size 
As mentioned in the main text the demand and supply functions are strictly valid only for the 
individual consumer and producer. However, what matters for the global equilibrium is the 
absolute amounts produced and consumed.  However, taking into account differences in country 
would not affect the conclusions, only the way the country-wide demand and supply functions 
are interpreted: 
If preferences are homothetic demand will just be proportional to the income of consumers 
(within any country).  Thus one can normalize the number and income of consumers in the 
home country to one.  There are α consumers abroad and their purchasing power per capita can 
be indicated by η.  This is implies that the overall demand of the foreign country is given by 
equation (5) multiplied by the product of these two parameters.  One interesting case would be 
that αη equals one.  In this case the overall income of consumers in both ‘countries’ would be 
equal, which is not too far from reality if one takes the OECD group as the ‘home’ country since 
the OECD countries account for slightly more than 50 % of global GDP.  (In this case one 
would of course have α> 1 and η<1. 
Similarly, the supply functions of each individual firms should be multiplied by the number 
(and productivity) of firms within in each country.  Using again the normalisation that there is 
one production unit at home one can parameterise the (relative) size of the foreign country by a 
parameter, μ. 
The total differential of this system of equations is then given by: 
(10)  d d dq q U d dp ) ( ' ' = + β  
(11)  d d dq q U dp * ) * ( ' ' αη =  
(12)  s s dq q TC d d dp ) ( ' ' = − + ε β  
(13)  s s dq q TC d dp * ) * ( ' ' * μ ε = −  
(14)  d d s s dq dq dq dq * * + = +  
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